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ChinaThis paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business
groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called
“XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we ﬁnd convincing evidence
of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive compen-
sation of the subsidiaries of business groups. Speciﬁcally, when the change in
performance of one subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries,
the change in its executive compensation is signiﬁcantly lower. Further, when
the business group is private and the level of marketization is high, the sub-
sidiary’s executive compensation is more likely to be inﬂuenced by the perfor-
mance of the other subsidiaries. This research improves our understanding of
the decision mechanisms of executive compensation in business groups and
enriches the literature on executive compensation and business groups.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The use of executive compensation as an incentive mechanism to reduce agency problems (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) is a core research area in corporate governance. There is much research about executive com-
pensation in China’s listed companies. The literature focuses mostly on pay–performance sensitivity (Fang,esearch
199) for
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2003; Chen and Zhang, 2006; Li and Hu, 2012). However, this empirical literature is generally based on the
implicit assumption that the listed companies are all independent, and that executive compensation is
determined only by the characteristics of the company itself and the industry. Yet not all listed companies
are independent. In Asian countries, independent companies are not even the main form of company. For
example, Claessens et al. (2002) ﬁnd that, in nine Asian countries, about 70% of the listed companies are con-
trolled by business groups. In China, as of 2011 almost 76% of listed companies belonged to diﬀerent groups
(Zheng et al., 2014).
Therefore, it is important to examine executive compensation under the circumstances of business groups.
From the perspective of business groups, the relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the
executives of the diﬀerent subsidiaries is just like the situation of one principle and many agents. According to
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) theory (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Murphy, 1999), in a multi-agent set-
ting, although agents are confronted with common risks, valuable information about an agent’s action can be
conveyed by the outputs of the other agents. Therefore, if we ignore the fact that most listed companies are
controlled by business groups, and if we fail to consider the inﬂuence of the other subsidiaries in the same
group, the results of studies on executive compensation may not be true or reliable and may even mislead pol-
icymakers, which in the end will lead to the ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
Exploring executive compensation in business groups is also an important task that can contribute to the
literature of business groups. To date, studies about business groups mainly focus on the tunneling behavior of
the ultimate shareholder (Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002; Baek et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2010) and inter-
nal capital markets (Shin and Park, 1999; Hoshi et al., 1991; Gopalan et al., 2007; Shao and Liu, 2007, 2009;
Yang, 2007; Ma and Chen, 2013; Almeida et al., 2014). These studies generally analyze the economic conse-
quences of the sophisticated ownership structure of business groups, but rarely study the incentive and deci-
sion mechanisms in business groups, which can aﬀect the governance of business groups directly. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to empirically examine the incentive mechanism in business groups.
Because business groups are prevalent around the world (Almeida et al., 2011; Masulis et al., 2013) and play
an important role in some countries, especially in China, learning how to maximize the value of business
groups requires us to open the black box of the incentive mechanism. Therefore, our research can shed light
on how to improve the governance of business groups and to some degree ﬁll the gap in the literature.
However, to examine subsidiaries’ executive compensation decision mechanism, we need to collect data on
the corporate governance of subsidiaries in business groups. Because non-public companies are not required
to disclose their data, traditional research on business groups generally assumes that one business group has
only one listed subsidiary company, and examines the operation or economic consequences based on this
assumption,1 which may not describe the business group comprehensively and objectively. In this study, we
use a unique dataset of China business groups to examine executive compensation in business groups. In
China, one special kind of business group, the so-called XiZu JiTuan in Chinese, has sprung up like bamboo
in the past 20 years. XiZu JiTuan is deﬁned as more than one listed company under the control of the same
ultimate shareholder, which is the output of the development of business groups in the capital markets (Ma
and Chen, 2013; Shao and Liu, 2007). These unique data allow us to explore the executive compensation deci-
sion mechanisms in the available business groups. The reasons are as follows. First, listed subsidiaries, as the
main members of XiZu JiTuan, are required to disclose detailed information about their executive compensa-
tion and corporate governance, thus solving the problems of data sources and data reliability. Second, the pre-
vious literature on corporate governance rarely controls for the inﬂuence of the characteristics of the ultimate
shareholder (e.g., their preferences) on corporate governance. In XiZu JiTuan, we can reduce this problem,
because diﬀerently listed subsidiaries are ultimately controlled by the same shareholder. Third, by analyzing
the ultimate shareholder’s treatment of the diﬀerent listed subsidiaries and the relationship between the ulti-
mate shareholder and listed subsidiaries, such as their position and the ownership structure, we can system-
atically investigate the motives for and economic consequences of resource allocation inside business groups.1 For example, Gopalan et al. (2007) and Shin and Park (1999) investigate the motive and eﬃciency of the internal capital market of
business groups indirectly, solely based on the study of listed companies.
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4124 ﬁrm-year observations, to examine subsidiaries’ executive compensation in business groups.
Speciﬁcally, if there are two listed subsidiaries in the same business group, named ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B, then
we examine whether the executive compensation of ﬁrm A is inﬂuenced by the performance of ﬁrm B, in
addition to ﬁrm A’s performance and other characteristics. Our empirical research provides a positive
answer. We ﬁnd that, in the same business group, the executive compensation of one listed subsidiary is
not only decided by its own performance but is also based on the performance of other listed subsidiaries
or their relative performance ranking. When the change in performance of one listed subsidiary is relatively
lower than that of other subsidiaries in the same business group, the change in executive compensation is
signiﬁcantly lower, which means that the relative performance evaluation (RPE) mechanism exists in deci-
sions about executive compensation in business groups. However, our further research shows that the RPE
mechanism in business groups exists more obviously only when business groups are private or the level of
marketization is high.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, unlike the previous literature on executive com-
pensation that focuses on independent companies, we study executive compensation under the circumstances
of business groups, which conforms more with the current situation of the capital markets in Asian countries,
especially in China, and avoids the bias in the existing literature while providing a new angle to study executive
compensation. Second, the current literature of business groups provides limited insights on the governance
inside business groups. To our best knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to study the incentive mechanism in busi-
ness groups empirically, which also contributes to the literature on business groups. Third, the paucity of RPE
in the components of executive compensation remains a puzzle (Murphy, 1999) and is not well understood in
the literature. We provide a better research design to test RPE in executive compensation. By examining the
RPE mechanism in business groups, we can control for the inﬂuence of the characteristics of the ultimate
shareholder and obtain more conservative and reliable results, which sheds more light on the puzzle of RPE.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical analysis and the cor-
responding hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and research design. Section 4 presents our empirical
analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
Executive compensation is a core issue in corporate governance. In a company, top managers are respon-
sible for regular operations and thus have a decisive inﬂuence on the company’s performance. However,
according to agency theory, as a rational agent the top manager has the motivation to maximize his own pri-
vate interest, which may be detrimental to the beneﬁts of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Therefore, designing an eﬀective incentive mechanism to encourage executives to work hard and maximize
the value of shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) becomes the most important issue in corporate
governance.
Since Holmstrom (1979, 1982) came up with RPE theory, many studies have examined the use of RPE in
incentive contracts, but they have obtained inconsistent results (Albuquerque, 2009).2 Murphy (1999) pro-
poses that the paucity of RPE in options and other components of executive compensation remains a puzzle
worth understanding. There are several potential explanations. First, the previous literature on executive com-
pensation is based on independent companies and ignores the fact that diﬀerent companies may belong to dif-
ferent groups. In business groups, the performance of one listed subsidiary and its executive compensation
may be inﬂuenced by other subsidiaries. If we ignore these factors, our results may be unreliable. Second,
the characteristics of the ultimate shareholder can vary greatly, which may also aﬀect the results if we do
not control for this factor. Therefore, it is very important to examine executive compensation from the per-
spective of business groups.2 The empirical studies of RPE proposed by Holmstrom (1979) obtain inconsistent results. For example, the results found by Gibbons
and Murphy (1990) support the existence of RPE, but many papers could not ﬁnd any evidence of the use of RPE (Barro and Barro, 1990;
Garvey and Milbourn, 2003). Janakiraman et al. (1992) ﬁnd that RPE exists only when performance is measured by stock returns.
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Theoretically, from the view of business groups, the use of RPE can be an eﬀective way to achieve the goal
of maximizing the value of the group. There are two main reasons for this.
First, the use of RPE in business groups provides incremental information for assessing the actions taken
by top managers. In business groups, the relationship between the ultimate shareholder and the executives of
diﬀerent subsidiaries is the situation of one principle and many agents. In this multi-agent setting, subsidiaries
in the same group may face a common risk, and the output of other agents contains some valuable informa-
tion about the agents’ actions (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982). Therefore, the payment of one agent should not only
be based on his own absolute performance, but also on his relative performance among the other agents, while
eliminating the eﬀects of common shocks. The tournament theory proposed by Lazear and Rosen (1981) states
that because the cost of supervising management is quite high, the agent’s compensation should be based on
his ranking of the marginal output, rather than his absolute marginal output. Under the circumstances of busi-
ness groups, the performance of one subsidiary is often aﬀected by other subsidiaries. By building an internal
capital market in a business group, internal resources can ﬂow between diﬀerent subsidiaries, which may
reduce transaction costs but result in a high correlation between the subsidiaries’ performance. Therefore,
to eﬀectively encourage executives, the decisions about subsidiaries’ compensation should consider the perfor-
mance of other subsidiaries. That is, when the performance of ﬁrm A is better than that of ﬁrm B, the exec-
utives of ﬁrm A should gain higher compensation.
Second, the use of RPE in business groups can ensure the executives’ feeling that pay is equal. How to make
executives feel that pay is fair is an important question. Both equity theory (Adams, 1965) and social compar-
ison theory (Festinger, 1954) state that workers will compare their input level and outcome with those of their
peers, and feel fairness only when the input level and the outcome match. When determining compensation, it
is very important to make employees feel that the results are fair (Greenberg, 1987), otherwise, the perceived
unfairness will lead to feelings of disenchantment, the temptation of negative sabotage and a loss of talent
(Adams, 1965). Therefore, the procedural justice of the distribution of rewards3 and perceptions of fairness
among executives are crucial to the healthy operation of business groups. When ﬁrm A performs better than
ﬁrm B, to meet the criteria of procedural justice, the executives of ﬁrm A should be rewarded with higher
compensation.
Hence, we propose our ﬁrst hypothesis.
H1. In the same business group, if ﬁrm A performs worse than ﬁrm B, the executive compensation of ﬁrm A
should be lower. That is, the RPE mechanism exists in business groups.2.2. Level of marketization
In China, there are various diﬀerences in the way executive compensation is designed and evaluated for
SOEs and non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2012). However, China’s diverse markets and geographic regions provide
suﬃcient variation in the level of marketization to study the eﬀects of the institutional environment on the
incentive mechanism in business groups.
2.2.1. Ownership type and executive compensation in business groups
In China, the compensation contracts of state-owned business groups (SOBG) are diﬀerent from the con-
tracts of non-state-owned business groups (non-SOBG).
First, SOEs are often controlled by the government. The government in China has the power to appoint
and dismiss the executives to strengthen their inﬂuence in the operation of SOEs and achieve their political
objectives. On the one hand, the executive compensation of SOEs is regulated by the government (Chen
et al., 2005), and emphasizes egalitarianism. On the other hand, SOEs are required to undertake many policy3 The organizational procedures are more frequently cited than outcomes as causes of unfairness in organizations (Greenberg, 1986;
Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987), and such procedures contribute more to job satisfaction than do outcomes (Alexander and Ruderman,
1987).
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Tan, 1999), so accounting-based performance plays a limited role in evaluating the performance of executives
in SOEs. Besides, executives, especially the CEO and the chairman of the board, are often also government
oﬃcials. The incentive of executives in SOEs may mostly come from the promotion of their administrative
position or managerial perks (Chen et al., 2005). The socialist government always has a tendency toward egal-
itarianism. The government prefers to pay executives average pay rather than performance-based compensa-
tion or pay based on tournament ranking (Lin et al., 2003). Therefore, executive compensation in SOBGs
depends less on the performance of other subsidiaries.
Second, the executive compensation in non-SOBGs is far more market oriented. Executives in non-SOBGs
mainly come from the market of professional managers, and ﬁrms must design more eﬀective contracts to
attract and retain talent. Moreover, the goal of non-SOBGs is to maximize the value of the company, so it
is rational to incentivize executives through performance-based compensation. In non-SOBGs, in evaluating
the performance of executives, the relative performance among diﬀerent subsidiaries contains more informa-
tion about the eﬀorts of executives.
Therefore, we propose our second hypothesis.
H2. Compared with SOBGs, the executive compensation in non-SOBGs depends more on the performance of
other subsidiaries in the same business group.2.2.2. Marketization and executive compensation in business groups
The last 30 years have seen a great development in the market economy of China (Fan and Wang, 2011). As
an important external governance mechanism, China’s marketization has improved the eﬃciency of capital
allocation (Fang, 2006), corporate governance (Jiang et al., 2010) and the value of companies (Xia and
Fang, 2005).
Theoretically, the development of marketization can impel business groups to design more eﬀective com-
pensation contracts. First, the higher the level of marketization, the stronger the legal protection of property
rights, and the tunneling and self-interested behavior of management is then constrained. Second, the degree
of regional marketization reﬂects the quality of the government administration. External corporate gover-
nance mechanisms include property rights, the government administration, legal protection, market competi-
tion, the credit system and the culture of contracts (Xia and Fang, 2005). In addition to legal protection,
government administration is another important characteristic that Chinese companies face that is quite dif-
ferent from that in other countries. When the level of marketization is high, there will be less unreasonable
government intervention, and executive compensation will also face less regulation, which can be helpful
for business groups in designing eﬀective compensation contracts. Third, the higher the degree of marketiza-
tion, the more intense the competition in the product market, and the greater the transparency and compara-
bility of a company’s performance. A company will be more likely to release information about the eﬀorts and
ability of its executives in the form of their accounting performance, because the information will be helpful in
creating a more eﬀective compensation policy. We thus propose our third hypothesis.
H3. The higher the degree of marketization under which the group company operates, the more the executive
compensation of the subsidiary depends on the performance of other subsidiaries in the business group.3. Research design
3.1. Data sources
We hand collect the XiZu JiTuan data in the following steps. In the ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the criteria for a
listed ﬁrm belonging to a business group, that is, the ultimate controlling shareholder can exercise “controlling
inﬂuence” over it (Almeida et al., 2011). In the second step, we analyze the detailed ownership structure data
that the Chinese government has required public companies to disclose in their annual ﬁnancial reports since
2003. Combining these ownership data with the list of Chinese large business groups in the “Annual Report on
the Development of China’s Large Enterprise Groups” (2004–2008) published by the National Bureau of
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holder. Finally, we obtain 271 XiZu JiTuan and 4124 ﬁrm-year observations from 2004 to 2012, after exclud-
ing ﬁnancial companies and observations lacking complete ﬁnancial data or data on the main variables. Our
ﬁnancial data are primarily from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.3.2. Research design
According to previous studies, executive compensation in business groups can have both the RPE mecha-
nism (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Albuquerque, 2009) and compensation peer group eﬀects (Bizjak et al.,
2008, 2011). To test the basic hypothesis H1, we use the following change model.DCompensationA;t ¼ a1DPerformanceB;t þ a2DPerformanceInd;t þ a3DPerformanceA;t þ a4DCompensationB;t
þ a5DCompensationInd;t þ aiControlsi;t þ eDCompensation is the change in executive compensation, deﬁned as executive compensation in of the current
year minus executive compensation in the previous year. In Chinese listed companies, the structure of execu-
tive compensation consists of basic salary and performance compensation but relatively little stock-based
compensation (Fang, 2009; Li et al., 2013). Therefore, we use the logarithm of the sum of the compensation
of the top three managers to measure executive compensation, and we do not include stock-based compensa-
tion. DPerformance is the change in current performance, which is current return on assets (ROA) minus the
ROA of the last year. The subscripts A and B refer to the diﬀerent subsidiaries in the same business group. If
we let ﬁrm A be the benchmark subsidiary, then the subscript B denotes another subsidiary, and if there are
more than two listed subsidiaries in the same business group, all subsidiaries except for ﬁrm A will be set as
ﬁrm B. DPerformanceInd,t and DCompensationInd,t are the change in the industry’s performance and the change
in the industry’s executive compensation, respectively, to control for industry eﬀects (Albuquerque, 2009;
Bizjak et al., 2008, 2011).
We also control for other variables. Following Bizjak et al. (2011), we include Lagged CompensationA and
Lagged PerformanceA to account for any mean reversion in pay and the autocorrelation of performance,
respectively. In general, previous research ﬁnds a positive correlation between the size of a company and
its executive compensation (Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2006). When the leverage of a company is high,
its executive compensation is constrained by its creditors. So we also include the size of the company (Size)
and its leverage (Lev). Because executives have the motive and the ability to increase their own compensation
due to their managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2002), we also control for variables such as the corporation’s
block holdings (Top 1), independence of the board (Independence), dual role of the CEO and chairman of the
board (Dual) and executives’ shareholdings (MShare). We also control for ﬁxed year, industry and location
eﬀects. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
The deﬁnitions for the variables are summarized in Table 1.4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables. As shown in the table, executives hold a
very small proportion of the stock (0.2%) in Chinese group companies, so it is reasonable to use only
cash-based compensation when measuring Chinese executive compensation. There is little diﬀerence in the
executive compensation and performance between subsidiaries A and B in the same group, which shows
the homogeneity of subsidiaries in the same business group. In addition, the average value of executive com-
pensation is about RMB1.25 million, and the diﬀerence between the highest and lowest pay is quite large, at
about 100 times.
Table 3 shows the sample distribution by year after dividing the whole sample into state-owned business
groups (SOBG) and non-state-owned business groups (NSOBG). We see that the proportion of SOBGs is
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
CompensationA Logarithm of sum of compensation of top three managers, the subscript A stands for one subsidiary A in
the business group
PerformanceA ROA of subsidiary A, deﬁned as net income divided by total assets
CompensationB Average value of the executive compensation of all of the listed subsidiaries except for ﬁrm A in the
business group
PerformanceB Average value of ROA of all of the listed subsidiaries except for ﬁrm A in the business group
CompensationInd Average value of executive compensation in ﬁrm A’s industry (excluding ﬁrm A)
PerformanceInd Average value of ROA in ﬁrm A’s industry (excluding ﬁrm A)
DCompensationA CompensationA,t  CompensationA,t1
DPerformanceA PerformanceA,t  PerformanceA,t1
DCompensationB CompensationB,t  CompensationB,t1
DPerformanceB PerformanceB,t  PerformanceB,t1
DPerformanceB (dummy) A dummy variable that equals 1 if Change in PerformanceB is larger than Change in PerformanceA, and 0
otherwise
DCompensationInd CompensationInd,t  CompensationInd,t1
DPerformanceInd PerformanceInd,t  PerformanceInd,t1
Lagged PerformanceA Subsidiary A’s ROA in the previous year, that is, PerformanceA,t1
Lagged CompensationA Subsidiary A’s executive compensation in the past year, that is, CompensationA,t1
Size Logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Lev Total debt to total assets at the end of the year
Top 1 Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
Independent Percentage of independent directors on the board
Dual Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise
MShare Percentage of shares held by management
Index The marketization index from Fan and Wang (2011)
Location Includes two dummy variables, Center and West. If the location of the company belongs to the central
area in China, Center equals 1 and 0 otherwise. If the location belongs to the west area, West equals 1
and 0 otherwise
Year Year dummy variables
Industry Industry dummy variables based on the CSRC classiﬁcations
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std Min Median Max
CompensationA 4124 13.710 0.822 11.450 13.760 16.050
PerformanceA 4124 0.028 0.066 0.291 0.030 0.198
CompensationB 4124 13.820 0.744 11.740 13.870 15.740
PerformanceB 4124 0.028 0.054 0.243 0.030 0.174
CompensationInd 4124 13.860 0.398 12.750 13.930 14.780
PerformanceInd 4124 0.142 0.959 0.383 0.035 7.813
DCompensationA 4124 0.136 0.355 1.026 0.093 1.405
DPerformanceA 4124 0.003 0.067 0.284 0.001 0.273
DCompensationB 4124 0.141 0.332 0.892 0.113 1.386
DPerformanceB 4124 0.003 0.065 0.329 0.001 0.274
DCompensationInd 4124 0.127 0.106 0.182 0.124 0.551
DPerformanceInd 4124 0.122 1.024 1.223 0.001 7.996
Lagged PerformanceA 4124 0.031 0.064 0.272 0.032 0.195
Lagged CompensationA 4124 13.570 0.845 11.230 13.610 15.990
Size 4124 21.930 1.319 19.000 21.780 27.750
Top 1 4124 0.398 0.159 0.092 0.391 0.779
LevA 4124 0.534 0.212 0.067 0.542 1.293
Independent 4124 0.357 0.047 0.231 0.333 0.556
MShare 4124 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.084
Dual 4124 0.095 0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000
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Table 3
Distribution of business groups by year.
Year All ﬁrms SOBGs Percentage (%) Non-SOBGs Percentage (%) N = 2 Percentage (%)
2004 359 302 84.12 57 15.88 131 36.49
2005 392 330 84.18 62 15.82 160 40.82
2006 393 334 84.99 59 15.01 160 40.71
2007 403 336 83.37 67 16.63 146 36.23
2008 441 374 84.81 67 15.19 163 36.96
2009 480 407 84.79 73 15.21 183 38.13
2010 516 432 83.72 84 16.28 201 38.95
2011 566 469 82.86 97 17.14 229 40.46
2012 574 478 83.28 96 16.72 228 39.72
Total 4124 3462 83.95 662 16.05 1601 38.82
Table 4
Correlation matrix of the main variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) DCompensationA 1 0.154
*** 0.055*** 0.180*** 0.042** 0.090*** 0.102*** 0.056*** 0.190***
(2) PerformanceA 0.103
*** 1 0.178*** 0.389*** 0.081*** 0.196*** 0.049** 0.051** 0.077***
(3) PerformanceB 0.047
** 0.276*** 1 0.090*** 0.411*** 0.215*** 0.148*** 0.071*** 0.107***
(4) DPerformanceA 0.109
*** 0.527*** 0.127*** 1 0.159*** 0.516*** 0.050** 0.147*** 0.126***
(5) DPerformanceB 0.014 0.118
*** 0.517*** 0.175*** 1 0.497*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.144***
(6) DPerformanceB (dummy) 0.083*** 0.214*** 0.208*** 0.413*** 0.375*** 1 0.069*** 0.015 0.017
(7) DCompensationB 0.085
*** 0.045** 0.084*** 0.025 0.046** 0.056*** 1 0.062*** 0.147***
(8) DPerformanceInd 0.008 0.030 0.049** 0.010 0.030 0.021 0.003 1 0.285***
(9) DCompensationInd 0.158
*** 0.072*** 0.098*** 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.019 0.126*** 0.074*** 1
Note: The lower diagonal presents Pearson coeﬃcients and the higher diagonal shows Spearman coeﬃcients.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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Notably, about 40% of the business groups have only two listed subsidiaries.
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis of the main variables. DCompensationA is positively correlated with
both PerformanceA and PerformanceB, the performance of all subsidiaries in the same group, which is inﬂu-
enced by internal capital markets. Thus, we generate a dummy variable DPerformanceB (dummy) that equals
one when DPerformanceB is larger than DPerformanceA in the same business group, and zero otherwise.
DPerformanceB (dummy) is negatively correlated with DCompensationA, suggesting that when ﬁrm A performs
worse than ﬁrm B, ﬁrm A’s executive compensation is lower, which supports our hypothesis H1.
DCompensationB and DCompensationA are positively correlated, which shows that executive compensation
amounts among diﬀerent subsidiaries in the same group change in the same direction, indicating that compen-
sation fairness is taken into consideration when determining executive compensation in Chinese business
groups.
4.2. Decision mechanism of executive compensation in business groups
We ﬁrst investigate whether the executive compensation of one subsidiary is inﬂuenced by the performance
of other subsidiaries in the same business group.
Table 5 presents the results.4 In the ﬁrst step, we run the regression with the subsample that only has two
listed subsidiaries in the same business group (columns 1–2), which shows that the coeﬃcient of
DPerformanceB is negative but insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient of DPerformanceB (dummy) is signiﬁcantly4 We only report the results using the Change Model. In an untabulated test, we run the regression using the Level Model and obtain the
same results.
Table 5
Regression of executive compensation on RPE in business groups using ROA.
Variables DCompensationA (change model)
Subsample with only two subsidiaries (N = 2) All ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPerformanceB 0.032 0.125
(0.24) (1.41)
DPerformanceB (dummy) 0.044** 0.040***
(2.39) (3.57)
DPerformanceA 0.617
*** 0.491*** 0.769*** 0.621***
(3.52) (2.63) (7.09) (5.35)
DPerformanceInd 0.006 0.005 0.0003 0.0003
(0.73) (0.68) (0.07) (0.07)
DCompensationB 0.049
** 0.053** 0.044*** 0.047***
(2.07) (2.23) (2.72) (2.89)
DCompensationInd 0.326
*** 0.324*** 0.234*** 0.235***
(3.65) (3.63) (3.95) (3.99)
Lagged PerformanceA 0.612
*** 0.618*** 0.753*** 0.750***
(2.70) (2.74) (5.66) (5.64)
Lagged CompensationA 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197***
(10.88) (10.94) (16.91) (16.91)
Size 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(6.25) (6.24) (9.10) (9.09)
Top 1 0.033 0.031 0.080** 0.078**
(0.59) (0.56) (2.33) (2.27)
Lev 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005
(0.03) (0.02) (0.12) (0.14)
Independent 0.174 0.172 0.0210 0.019
(1.06) (1.04) (0.20) (0.17)
MShare 1.018 0.983 0.034 0.025
(1.26) (1.23) (0.06) (0.05)
Dual 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022
(1.01) (0.93) (1.27) (1.20)
Constant 1.461*** 1.485*** 1.725*** 1.738***
(5.83) (5.93) (11.29) (11.43)
Location Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
Observations 1601 1601 4124 4124
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.163 0.154 0.156
F 6.454 6.698 14.71 15.28
Notes: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company) and we report robust t values.
Columns 1 and 2 are the results using the subsample of business groups with only two listed subsidiaries, and columns 3 and 4 are the
results using the whole sample of business groups. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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are the same. These results show that when ﬁrm A performs worse than another ﬁrm B in the same group, the
change in executive compensation of ﬁrm A is signiﬁcantly lower. Thus the RPE mechanism exists in the exec-
utive compensation of business groups, which supports hypothesis H1.
For the control variables, the coeﬃcient of DPerformanceInd is negative but insigniﬁcant. This result shows
that executive compensation in business groups rarely depends on the performance of the industry. The result
is similar to that of Li et al. (2013), who ﬁnd that very few companies choose industry performance to evaluate
the performance of their executives in China. The coeﬃcient of DCompensationB is signiﬁcantly positive, which
shows that the executive compensation of other subsidiaries in the same group is chosen as the compensation
peer group. Similar to Bizjak et al. (2008, 2011), the coeﬃcient of DCompensationInd is signiﬁcantly positive.
This result shows that, for executive compensation, business groups also use industry compensation peer
groups as a benchmark.
4.3. Moderating eﬀect of ownership type
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results when the sample is divided based on the ownership type of the busi-
ness groups. In columns 1 and 2, the coeﬃcient of DPerformanceB is positive in the subsample of SOBGs but
signiﬁcantly negative in the subsample of non-SOBGs. In columns 3 and 4, the coeﬃcient of DPerformanceB
(dummy) is negative in SOBGs and non-SOBGs, but the value of non-SOBGs is signiﬁcantly larger than that
of SOBGs. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is supported. In non-SOBGs, subsidiaries are more likely to adopt the
RPE mechanism for executive compensation. Besides, the coeﬃcient of DCompensationB is signiﬁcantly pos-
itive only in SOBGs, showing that pay fairness is emphasized more in the determination of executive compen-
sation in state-owned ﬁrms. That is, SOBGs are more likely to use other subsidiaries’ compensation as their
benchmark in determining executive compensation.
4.4. Moderating eﬀect of the level of marketization
Next, we test the moderating eﬀect of the level of marketization. Following the literature (Fan et al., 2011),
we use the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index as a proxy for China’s marketization. The
Index is comprised of several dimensions, namely the relationship between the government and the market,
the development of the non-state sector, the development of factor markets, the development of product mar-
kets, and the development of market intermediaries and the legal environment. The NERI Index has been
developed by Fan and Wang since 2001 to reﬂect conditions in the 30 provinces of China (excluding
Tibet). The NERI Index captures the process of institutional transition in the provinces. We divide the sample
based on the median value of marketization and run the basic regression accordingly. The results are reported
in Panel B of Table 6.
We can see that the coeﬃcients of DPerformanceB and DPerformanceB (dummy) are both signiﬁcantly neg-
ative only with a higher level of marketization, which means that group companies are more likely to use the
RPE mechanism only when the market economy is highly developed. Moreover, the coeﬃcient of
DCompensationB is signiﬁcantly positive only when the degree of marketization is high, meaning that the exec-
utive compensation of one subsidiary is more likely to use other subsidiaries’ compensation as their bench-
mark with more developed marketization. When a company is faced with intense market competition, it is
very important for the company to retain its talent, which requires the company to ensure that executives feel
they have been fairly paid.
4.5. Robustness tests
We perform the following robustness tests to make sure our results are robust and convincing.
4.5.1. Inﬂuence of earnings management
According to Schipper (1989), managers have the motivation to pursue their own beneﬁts through earnings
management. The problem is more severe in transition economies with insider control problems and in
Table 6
Moderating eﬀects of ownership type and level of marketization.
DCompensationA (all ﬁrms)
Variables Panel A: Ownership type Panel B: Level of marketization
SOBGs Non-SOBGs SOBGs Non-SOBGs High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DPerformanceB 0.026 0.395** 0.172* 0.069
(0.25) (2.39) (1.69) (0.39)
DPerformanceB (dummy) 0.024** 0.113*** 0.044*** 0.026
(1.99) (3.72) (3.52) (1.04)
DPerformanceA 0.867
*** 0.583** 0.785*** 0.177 0.738*** 0.895*** 0.561*** 0.815***
(6.99) (2.55) (5.88) (0.73) (6.12) (3.49) (4.37) (2.98)
DPerformanceInd 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007
(0.41) (0.82) (0.36) (0.99) (0.09) (0.29) (0.11) (0.25)
DCompensationB 0.039
** 0.042 0.042** 0.048 0.062*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.002
(2.08) (1.18) (2.23) (1.33) (3.37) (0.12) (3.51) (0.05)
DCompensationInd 0.197
*** 0.370*** 0.198*** 0.386*** 0.252*** 0.172 0.252*** 0.180
(2.96) (2.68) (2.98) (2.88) (3.69) (1.38) (3.71) (1.46)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value for diﬀerence on DPerformanceB 0.028 0.005 0.231 0.504
Observations 3462 662 3462 662 3162 962 3162 962
Adjusted R-squared 0.157 0.143 0.158 0.155 0.154 0.156 0.156 0.156
F 12.83 3.291 13.06 3.786 11.27 4.59 11.74 4.69
Notes: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company) and we report robust t values.
Panel A presents the results divided into SOBGs and non-SOBGs, and Panel B presents the results based on the level of marketization.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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(Allena et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010), the phenomenon of earnings management is very serious and earnings
quality is quite low (Wang and Wu, 2011; Fung et al., 2013). To control for the inﬂuence of earnings manage-
ment, we follow Firth et al. (2006) in using return on sales (ROS) to measure accounting performance. Because
operating income and sales are less susceptible to manipulation than net proﬁt and total assets, respectively,
ROS is a cleaner measure of accounting performance.
Table 7 presents the results when performance is measured by ROS. In the full sample regression, the coef-
ﬁcient of DPerformanceB (dummy) is signiﬁcantly negative, supporting hypothesis H1 that the RPE mechanism
exists in business groups. The moderating eﬀects of ownership type and the level of marketization are also the
same as before.4.5.2. Market performance
Generally, the evaluation measures of performance in executive compensation contracts use both account-
ing performance and market performance. In this section, we use the annual stock return adjusted by the mar-
ket return (RET) to measure market performance. RET is deﬁned as ðQ12t¼1ð1þ RitÞ 
Q12
t¼1ð1þ RmtÞÞ, where
Rit is the monthly stock return after considering cash dividend reinvestments, and Rmt is the monthly market
stock return. The period runs from January to December every year.
Table 8 presents the results. The coeﬃcient of DPerformanceB and DPerformanceB (dummy) are both neg-
ative but insigniﬁcant, and the results of the subgroup regressions have no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (unreported).
Li et al. (2013) conduct a survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies and ﬁnd that
accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few ﬁrms using stock returns
Table 7
Regression of executive compensation on RPE in business groups using ROS.
Dependent Var. Independent Vars.
Change in CompensationA DPerformanceB DPerformanceB (dummy)
Coeﬃcient t-Stat. R2 (%) Coeﬃcient t-Stat. R2 (%)
Panel A: All Firms 0.018 0.52 14.9 0.025** 2.29 15.0
Panel B: Subsample divided by ownership type
SOBGs 0.068* 1.74 15.0 0.012 1.06 15.0
Non-SOBGs 0.085 1.23 14.1 0.084*** 2.83 15.0
P-value for diﬀerence 0.049 0.022
Panel C: Subsample divided by the level of marketization
High level 0.006 0.16 14.7 0.032*** 2.67 14.9
Low level 0.139 1.41 15.9 0.001 0.05 15.6
P-value for diﬀerence 0.160 0.219
Notes: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company) and we report robust t values.
The results present executive compensation on RPE in business groups using the ROS performance measure, and we only report the
coeﬃcients of DPerformanceB and DPerformanceB (dummy) in the table. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
Table 8
Regression of executive compensation on RPE in business groups using RET.
DCompensationA
Subsample with N = 2 All ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPerformanceB 0.002 0.015*
(0.18) (1.82)
DPerformanceB (dummy) 0.012 0.017
(0.61) (1.36)
DPerformanceA 0.005 0.002 0.033
*** 0.024**
(0.29) (0.10) (2.98) (2.08)
DPerformanceInd 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.006
(0.27) (0.30) (0.36) (0.24)
DCompensationB 0.049
** 0.048** 0.042** 0.043***
(2.08) (2.04) (2.56) (2.59)
DCompensationInd 0.316
*** 0.314*** 0.226*** 0.225***
(3.42) (3.40) (3.74) (3.72)
Other variables Control Control Control Control
Observations 1542 1542 3976 3976
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.155 0.147 0.147
F 6.089 6.112 13.65 13.55
Notes: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company), and we report robust t values.
The results present the regression of executive compensation on RPE in business groups using market performance RET, and we only
report the coeﬃcients of the main independent variables in the table. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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Table 9
Regression of executive compensation on RPE in business groups using an alternative compensation measure.
DCompensationA (alternative measure of compensation)
Subsample with N = 2 All ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPerformanceB 0.195 0.197*
(1.20) (1.75)
DPerformanceB (dummy) 0.040 0.037**
(1.57) (2.31)
DPerformanceA 0.366
** 0.211 0.521*** 0.375***
(1.99) (1.08) (4.16) (2.74)
DPerformanceInd 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14)
DCompensationB 0.065
** 0.065** 0.041** 0.041**
(2.45) (2.44) (2.30) (2.32)
DCompensationInd 0.291
** 0.289** 0.340*** 0.340***
(2.10) (2.08) (3.81) (3.82)
Other variables Control Control Control Control
Observations 1448 1448 3772 3772
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.155 0.161 0.161
F 6.403 6.424 16.07 16.17
Notes: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company), and we report robust t values.
The results present executive compensation on RPE in business groups using an alternative measure of executive compensation, and we
only report the coeﬃcients of the main independent variables in the table. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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ital market has not been developing for long, so the eﬃciency of the market may not be as great as in the mar-
kets of developed countries, which may also explain our ﬁndings.
4.5.3. Alternative measure of executive compensation
In China, executives include both top managers and directors. We use the logarithm of the sum of the com-
pensation of the top three directors to measure executive compensation, and get the same results as before (see
Table 9).
4.5.4. Inﬂuence of intra-group transactions
The literature identiﬁes tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in business groups (Bae et al., 2002;
Bertrand et al., 2002). Because of the poor legal system and the existing dominant shareholders in companies,
China is an environment that is highly conducive to tunneling behavior (Jiang et al., 2010). Intra-group trans-
actions will aﬀect the performance of subsidiaries and executive compensation, so it is necessary to control for
this factor. Following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the other receivables from parent companies or their aﬃliated
companies to measure controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior, and the results (unreported) remain
unchanged.
5. Conclusion
It is important to investigate how executive compensation in diﬀerent subsidiaries is determined in business
groups. Using unique data on business groups in China from 2003 to 2012, we shed light on the decision mech-
anism of executive compensation in business groups. Our results show that the RPE mechanism exists in
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sidiaries in the same business group, executive compensation is signiﬁcantly lower in that subsidiary than in
others. In addition, we ﬁnd that the ownership type of business groups and the level of marketization play an
important role in determining executive compensation in the groups. When the business groups are
non-SOBGs and the level of marketization under which the group operates is high, business groups are more
likely to adopt the RPE mechanism in executive compensation. Our research enriches the literature on exec-
utive compensation and addresses the gap in the literature on business groups.
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